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Abstract. We address the security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution with
squeezed states upon realistic conditions of noisy and lossy environment and limited
reconciliation efficiency. Considering the generalized preparation scheme and clearly
distinguishing between classical and quantum resources, we investigate the effect of finite
squeezing on the tolerance of the protocol to untrusted channel noise. For a long-distance
strongly attenuating channel and the consequent low reconciliation efficiency, we show
that feasible limited squeezing is surprisingly sufficient to provide the security of Gaussian
quantum key distribution in the presence of untrusted noise. We explain the effect by behaviour
of the Holevo quantity, which describes the information leakage, and is effectively minimized
by the squeezed states.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Dv, 03.67.Dd
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] is well known to be the main practical application of
the fundamental principles of quantum physics on the single quanta level and is the core part
of quantum information processing. It has its goal in establishing communication channels,
where physical principles guarantee the security of cryptographic keys. First proposed for the
single quanta (qubits), it was lately developed on the basis of continuous variables (CV) [3],
which are observables of either coherent [4, 5, 6, 7] or squeezed [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] states of
light. Due to use of quadrature modulation and homodyne measurement the latter approach
does not need single-photon sources and detectors. In a typical CV QKD scenario, one of the
trusted parties (Alice) performs displacement of a carrier state by modulating it in one or both
of complementary quadratures. States are sent thought the channel, that is assumed to be fully
under the control of a potential eavesdropper (Eve) and are then detected by the remote trusted
party (Bob), which randomly measures one of the quadratures using a homodyne detector
(or simultaneously both quadratures using a pair of the homodyne detectors in the balanced
heterodyne scenario [13, 14]). After transmitting a sufficient number of bits, parties exchange
classical information and apply classical algorithms to perform reconciliation, which includes
discretization of Gaussian data and error correction and results in identical bit strings, from
which the secure key is distilled using classical privacy amplification algorithms.
The unconditional security of the CV QKD protocols was proven for the general case of
collective attacks [15, 16] (which implies security against the most general coherent attacks
[17]) using extremality of Gaussian states [18] as such that provide maximum information to
an eavesdropper. The lower bound on the unconditionally secure key rate in a generic direct
and reverse reconciliation (DR and RR respectively) Gaussian CV QKD protocol has the form
[19, 20]:
IDR = βIAB − χAE , IRR = βIAB − χBE (1)
where IAB is the mutual information between trusted parties, Holevo quantity χAE (χBE)
is the upper bound on information, which can be available to an eavesdropper under the
collective attacks scenario, and β is the reconciliation efficiency, which characterizes, how
effectively trusted parties process the data. The security of a scheme is established as the
positivity of the lower bound (1) in either reconciliation scenario.
The successful experimental demonstrations of the CV QKD were performed [19, 21, 22,
23], but two serious limitations were revealed. First, the DR scenario was remarkably shown
to be unable to provide security under channel losses higher than −3dB [4] (the limitation,
which can be overcome by the use of either post-selection [22] or the RR scheme [5]). On
the other hand, existing reconciliation algorithms suffer from low efficiency (the effect, also
known in the discrete-variable QKD [24]), especially under RR and high level of loss [19].
To overcome this limitation, the discrete modulation of coherent states [25, 26, 27, 28, 29]
can be used. Alternatively, it might be expected, that squeezing can qualitatively help when
the reconciliation efficiency is limited and thus lowers IAB. Since the analysis of DR and RR
squeezed state protocol upon limited β has not been carried out in [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15] and
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Figure 1. a) Continuous-variable quantum key distribution scheme: Alice generates squeezed
signal states with squeezed variance V and applies independent and generally different
amplitude and phase quadrature displacement to encode each next bit using amplitude and
phase quadrature modulators (AM and PM ). The signal travels through an untrusted lossy
and noisy channel and is measured by Bob using two homodyne detectors, for T = 1 the
measurement is homodyne, and for T = 1/2 it is heterodyne. b) Equivalent general source
model based on the coupling of two oppositely-squeezed beams with different squeezing
parameters and heterodyne measurement at the Alice side, fed by a squeezed state.
squeezing was not distinguished from high modulation, it is not clear how much we gain from
the feasible amount of squeezing.
In this paper, we predict that feasible limited squeezing is sufficient to reach evident
tolerance to the channel noise for the long-distance quantum channels when the signal-
to-noise ratio and, accordingly, reconciliation efficiency are low. To prove it, we have
modified the entanglement-based scheme [30] to be able to distinguish between the resources
by independently varying squeezing and displacement in the state preparation. Thus we
compare squeezed-state and coherent-state Gaussian protocols with optimal displacement
under conditions of the same low reconciliation efficiency. We show the linear improvement
of the security region by squeezing, which results in the fact that even limited squeezing
can provide robustness to noise about an order of magnitude higher than is tolerable by
coherent states. The result principally opens an experimentally feasible Gaussian-modulation
alternative to the discrete modulation protocols, recently proposed for the same purpose of
overcoming limited reconciliation.
2. Modified entanglement-based scheme
We verify the security of squeezed and coherent states in the conditions of an untrusted
channel with transmittance η and excess noise ǫ. Since we estimate the maximum
performance of a state in the Gaussian CV QKD, we assume that the state preparation is
noiseless. At the same time we follow the pessimistic scenario and consider all the noise,
observed by the remote party, as untrusted (it can be both channel and untrusted detector
noise).
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We consider the displacement and measurement of quadrature observables of a light
mode, which can be introduced as linear combination of anihilation and creation operators of
the given mode as x = a† + a and p = i(a† − a). Under such a definition the quadrature
fluctuations of a vacuum or coherent state mode will be equal to 1, which we refer to as the
shot-noise unit (SNU).
To access both displacement and squeezing independently in the conditions of noisy
channel we perform calculations modeling the general prepare-and-measure scheme (see
figure 1 (a)) by the equivalent entanglement-based (EPR) scheme (figure 1 (b)) representing
a slightly modified version of the original scheme from [30]. In this scheme the source is
constructed by coupling two differently oppositely squeezed modes, while the measurement of
Alice is carried out as heterodyne with the second input of the beam splitter fed by a squeezed
vacuum with the squeezing direction being the same as measured by Alice. With varying the
squeezing value, either coherent or squeezed state is conditionally prepared in Bob’s mode.
The correspondence between the modified EPR-based scheme and the generalized preparation
scheme in terms of variances reads
V1,2 = V + σx ±
√
(V + σx)(σx + V σp(V + σx))
1 + V σp
(2)
Vm =
V 2σp(V + σx)
σx(1 + V σp)
, (3)
where σx and σp are variances of, respectively, amplitude and phase quadrature
displacement, and V is squeezed variance in the prepare-and-measure scheme; V1 is squeezed
and V2 is anti-squeezed variance of the states, used to construct the entangled state, and Vm is
the squeezed variance of the state put to the free port of a heterodyne detector at Alice side in
the EPR-based scheme.
The mutual Shannon information between parties is the same for both DR and RR
scenarios and is calculated using variances and conditional variances of the respective mode
quadratures as IAB = 1/2 log2 VB/VB|A = 1/2 log2 VA/VA|B, where VA = 1/4(V1+V2+2Vm)
is the variance of Alice’s mode, VB = η/2(V1+V2+2ǫ)+1− η is Bob’s mode variance after
the channel, and VB|A = VB − C2AB/VA, where CAB =
√
η(V2 − V1)/2
√
2 is the correlation
between Alice and Bob, so that
VB|A =
1
2
(
2− η(V1 − V2)
2
V1 + V2 + 2Vm
+ η(V1 + V2 + 2ǫ− 2)
)
(4)
(similarly for VA|B). Without loss of generality, we assume that x-quadrature is
squeezed in the prepare-and-measure scenario and is, accodringly, measured by Alice in
the entanglement-based scheme. In the case, when the squeezing direction is orthogonally
rotated, the results for the squeezing and measurement of p-quadrature are directly accesible
by transitions V1 → 1/V1, V2 → 1/V2 and Vm → 1/Vm.
In terms of the prepare-and-measure generalized scheme, the mutual information
between the trusted parties reads:
IxAB =
1
2
log2
[
1 +
σxη
λ+ η(V + ǫ− 1)
]
, (5)
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where λ = 1 corresponds to homodyne detection and λ = 2 to heterodyne (note that obtaining
classical information from the measurements of anti-squeezed quadrature is ineffective, unless
the state is close to coherent). However, in the following exposition we consider only
homodyne measurement. The reason for this is that heterodyne, being advantageous under
RR and disadvantageous under DR, can be regarded as the particular case of ”fighting noise
with noise” [11] when trusted noise at the Bob side decouples Eve from the measurement
results. This effect is practically independent of squeezing (being valid also for coherent sates
if bases are switched) and does not change the results below, which reveal the role of limited
squeezing in CV QKD.
As was mentioned, Eve’s information under the assumption of collective eavesdropping
strategy is upper limited by the Holevo quantity χAE (χBE upon RR). The Holevo quantity
can be written as χAE = SE −
∫
P (A)SE|AdA, where SE is the von Neumann entropy
of the eavesdropper state ρE [19]. The quantity SE|A is the von Neumann entropy of the
eavesdropper state ρE|A conditioned by the reference side measurement result A and P (A)
is the distribution of the measured results. In case of Gaussian modulation of the coherent
or squeezed states the entropy SE|A does not depend on Alice’s measurement results and the
Holevo quantity is expressed as χAE = SE−SE|A (similarly, χBE = SE−SE|B in the reverse
reconciliation scenario) [31]. If channel noise is present, it is assumed that in the worst-
case scenario the eavesdropper can purify the state shared between the trusted parties, thus
SE = SAB, where SAB is the entropy of the state between Alice and Bob, and SE|A = SBC|A,
and SBC|A is calculated from the conditional two-mode state (including Alice’s heterodyne
mode C) after Alice’s projective measurement. Similar considerations apply for the case
of RR and give slightly simpler expression χBE = SAB − SA|B (since Alice’s heterodyne
measurement does not change the entropies and taking mode C into account is not necessary),
with the latter term being calculated from the state shared between Alice and Bob conditioned
on Bob’s measurement.
The covariance matrix γAB of the two-mode Alice-Bob state after heterodyne at Alice is
given by:
γAB =


V xA 0
√
ηCxAB 0
0 V pA 0
√
ηCpAB√
ηCxAB 0 η(V
x
B + ǫ− 1) + 1 0
0
√
ηCpAB 0 η(V
p
B + ǫ− 1) + 1

 , (6)
where source variances are V xA = (V1+V2+2Vm)/4, V
p
A = 1/(4V1)+1/(4V2)+1/(2Vm),
V xB = (V1 + V2)/2, V
p
B = 1/(2V1) + 1/(2V2), and source correlations are CxAB = (V2 −
V1)/(2
√
2) and CpAB = (1/V2 − 1/V1)/(2
√
2).
The conditional matrix γxBA after Bob’s homodyne measurement in x, which is used in
the calculation of the RR scenario, is obtained ([19]) as
γxBA = γA − σAB(XγBX)MPσTAB, (7)
where γA , γB and σAB are the submatrices of γAB, standing for individual modes and
their correlation, MP denotes the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of a matrix and X is the
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2 × 2 matrix, with elements equal to 0, except the first, which is 1. The resulting matrix γxBA
is given by
γxBA =
(
V xA − η(V1−V2)
2
8+4η(V1+V2+2ǫ−2)
0
0 V pA
)
. (8)
The entropies then are given by the expressions SAB = G[(λ1−1)/2]+G[(λ2−1)/2] and
SA|B = G[(λ3 − 1)/2], where λ1,2 are the symplectic eigenvalues of the matrix γAB, λ3 is the
symplectic eigenvalue of γxBA , and G(x) = (x+ 1) log(x+ 1)− x log x. Similar calculations
apply to the DR scenario, when SBC|A is calculated from two symplectic eigenvalues of the
covariance matrix γxABC after Alice’s measurement in x.
In the simplest case of a purely lossy channel the key rate can be relatively easy
calculated analytically. Indeed, the channel in this case can be described as a beam splitter
with transmittance η. Then the state, which is available to Eve for collective measurement,
is the state of the second output mode of the beam splitter. The von Neumann entropies,
contributing to the Holevo quantity, are directly calculated from two symplectic eigenvalues
λ1,2 of the two 2 × 2 covariance matrices, describing Eve’s mode state ρE before and ρE|A
(or ρE|B depending on reconciliation direction) after the respective trusted party measurement
(calculated similarly to (7)), resulting in χ = G[(λ1− 1)/2]−G[(λ2− 1)/2]. The symplectic
eigenvalues are then the square roots of covariance matrix determinants, which, since matrices
are diagonal, are the products of matrix elements, and, in the more relevant case of reverse
reconciliation, read:
λ1 =
∏
i={x,p}
√
V iB(1− η) + η (9)
λ2 =
√(
V xB (1− η) + η −
(CxBE)
2
V xBη + 1− η
)(
V pB(1− η) + η
)
, (10)
where Cx,pBE =
√
η(1− η)(1 − V x,pB ) is the correlation between Bob’s and Eve’s modes
in x(p) quadrature (note, that similar calculations apply to the measurement of p quadrature).
Taking into account the expressions for mode variances, after straightforward calculations
these symplectic eigenvalues directly give expression for the Holevo quantity, and, being
combined with mutual information (5) lead to the analytical expression for the lower bound
on the key rate (1) under pure channel loss.
In the presence of channel noise the calculations were performed semianalytically with
numerical estimations in the general case and analytical expressions in the limiting cases.
Further we estimate the key rate and establish the security bounds in terms of the tolerable
channel noise, which is the main objective limitation for security of the protocols, since any
loss can be tolerated upon the RR.
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3. Squeezed state quantum key distribution (QKD) with limited reconciliation efficiency
While in [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15] the reconciliation efficiency is perfect, we focus here on limited
reconciliation efficiency. This must be taken into account, since it turns out to be one of
the main practical limiting factors for the Gaussian CV QKD, especially if RR is used. In
particular, the efficiency β ∈ (0.8, 0.9)was reached in the recent experimental implementation
of the Gaussian CV QKD with coherent states and RR [19], and thus the scheme was limited
by the 25 km distance (corresponding to transmittance η ≈ 0.3), while displacement had to
be optimized.
Although reconciliation efficiency can be relatively high in the case of DR, we start
from this scenario. First, on figure 2 (left) we show how the secure key rate depends on
displacement variance for different values of squeezing and reconciliation efficiency. It is
evident from the plots that even moderate squeezing (−3dB) quantitatively improves the key
rate, while displacement variance must be optimized.
0 20 40 60 80 100
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0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
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0 20 40 60 80 100
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0.06
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0.10
I
Figure 2. Lower bound on the key rate secure against collective attacks in the DR (left) and RR
(right) scenarios for coherent state V = 1 (dotted lines), moderately squeezed states V = 0.5
(dashed lines) and strongly squeezed states V = 0.1 (solid lines). Upper lines correspond to
reconciliation efficiency β = 0.95, lower lines correspond to β = 0.9. Channel transmittance
is η = 0.6 for DR and η = 0.1 for RR.
Similar behaviour is demonstrated by the security region in terms of the tolerable channel
noise, which also depends on squeezing and displacement (see figure 3).
As was already analyzed in [12], upon perfect reconciliation, limited squeezing with
low modulation (small displacement variance) improves the tolerance of the DR scheme
to loss, while infinitely strong squeezing is disadvantageous from the point of view of
tolerable channel noise, compared to the coherent states. In contrast to this, upon imperfect
reconciliation, squeezing continuously improves the security region of the protocol, while
displacement must be limited and optimized to provide maximum tolerance to channel noise
for given signal state variance. Optimization was performed for the case of DR at fixed values
of β with the results given in figure 4 for low channel transmittance. The results evidently
demonstrate the positive role of finite squeezing for DR upon imperfect reconciliation.
Moreover, when efficiency β is low enough, squeezing appears to be strictly required
to establish secure quantum communication, as Gaussian modulated coherent states fail to
provide a positive key rate even upon purely lossy channel. This restriction was analytically
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Figure 3. Security region for the CV QKD scheme upon DR versus squeezed variance V
and displacement variance σ for channel transmittance η = 0.6 and reconciliation efficiency
β = 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6 (from left to right, from top to bottom).
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
V0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
Εmax
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
V0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
Εmax
Figure 4. Maximum tolerable channel excess noise versus squeezing V upon optimized
displacement variance σ, applied to both quadratures. Left: DR, reconciliation efficiency
β = 0.9, 0.85, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6 (from top to bottom), channel transmittance η = 0.6; right: RR,
reconciliation efficiency β = 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2 (from top to bottom), channel transmittance
η = 0.1.
obtained already for the case of individual attacks on coherent states-based protocol when
security can be provided only for reconciliation efficiency within the security constraint
β > 1/η − 1, η ∈ (0.5, 1) (for optimized displacement, giving the highest key rate). For
the case of collective attacks, the maximum variance of the signal states, providing positive
key rate, upon optimized displacement, was calculated numerically and is given in figure 5.
It is clearly seen, that squeezing of the states becomes required upon reduced reconciliation
efficiency and low channel transmittance, and the necessity in squeezing is enforced by a
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Figure 5. Maximum squeezed variance of the signal states, providing a positive key rate, upon
direct reconciliation and optimized displacement, for the given reconciliation efficiency β and
different values of channel transmittance η = 0.99, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.51 (from left to right).
decrease of both of the parameters. Thus, in the respective region of parameters, Gaussian
DR CV QKD protocol enters strictly the nonclassical regime when only squeezed states can
provide security of the key, even under pure channel loss.
However, since the DR scenario is more effective in terms of reconciliation and it
cannot tolerate transmittances lower than 0.5, it is more important to analyze how limited
reconciliation affects the RR scheme. Indeed, the RR protocols, already being less effective
in data processing, are aimed to perform upon highly lossy long-distance channels, while
losses additionally decrease signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and, accordingly, β. The explicit
dependence of β on SNR is the intrinsic feature of a particular scheme, as it also depends on
the effectiveness of classical algorithms used for Gaussian data binarization and subsequent
error correction. The practical reconciliation codes are known to provide less than 50%
efficiency for SNR around 1 [32]. However, in practice (from the implementation of a
coherent protocol [19]) it is known that the key rate is the convex function of SNR for
β < 1 and the lower the reconciliation efficiency, the lower the optimal displacement variance.
Moreover, for reduced efficiency the displacement must be limited. For β = 0.7, for example,
the maximum applicable displacement variance for coherent states is approximately 4 SNU,
which, in turn, makes SNR about 0.4 after the channel with 10% transmittance, and this
additionally lowers the achievable reconciliation efficiency below 50%. Thus, it is generally
reasonable to consider low values of β in order to clarify the role of the resources in the
applicability of Gaussian QKD under RR scenario.
The results of the numerical estimation of the key rate for the reduced reconciliation
efficiency of the reverse protocol under purely lossy channel with transmittance η = 0.1 are
given in figure 2 (right). Similarly to the case of DR, squeezing quantitatively improves the
key rate already for the pure channel loss, and under reduced efficiency displacement variance
must be optimized to provide maximum key rate. In case when displacement is optimized,
even moderate squeezing is shown to improve the key rate values and the maximum distance
of the Gaussian protocol upon the given fixed channel noise ǫ, as seen from figure 6 (left).
The security region of the RR Gaussian protocol in terms of the maximum tolerable
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Figure 6. Left: lower bound on the key rate secure against collective attacks in the RR
scenario versus distance (in fiber with standard attenuation of -0.2 dB/km) for coherent V = 1
(dotted lines), moderately squeezed V = 0.5 (dashed lines) and strongly squeezed V = 0.1
(solid lines) signal states upon optimized displacement variance. Upper lines correspond to
reconciliation efficiency β = 0.95 and lower lines correspond to β = 0.9. Channel noise is
fixed at ǫ = 0.1. Right: profile of the Holevo quantity, upper limiting the information, available
to Eve in the RR scheme versus state squeezing V and applied displacement variance σ for
low channel transmittance η = 0.1 and no channel noise.
channel noise demonstrates the analogous behaviour as seen from figure 7: under reduced
efficiency the security region is shrinking and displacement variance must be reduced as well
(which is already known for a coherent protocol [19]). Note, that ”traditional” squeezed-based
schemes [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] with displacement variance σ = 1/V − V start to be inapplicable
under limited β. However, it turns out that squeezed states allow higher displacement variance
and provide higher tolerable excess noise. This is clearly visible from the profiles of the
maximum tolerable channel excess noise under optimized displacement variance, given in
figure 4 (right), for various values of β. While for relatively high β = 0.8 and even β = 0.6
coherent states (V = 1) still show a reasonable offset in terms of the tolerable channel noise,
for lower reconciliation efficiency it is negligibly small, at the same time even moderate
squeezing provides tolerance to noise. Remarkably, the dependence on squeezing remains
close to linear, i.e. squeezing is linearly improving maximum tolerable channel noise in the
whole region of reconciliation efficiency. At the same time, under low efficiencies Gaussian
modulated coherent states fail to demonstrate any noticeable tolerance to noise.
In the limiting case of highly squeezed states V → 0 the displacement variance must be
in the range:
1
1 +
√
β
< σ|V→0 <
1
1−√β (11)
The typical values of maximum tolerable channel excess noise ǫ upon fixed limited
reconciliation efficiency β and optimal displacement variance σ for coherent states V = 1 and
moderately squeezed states V = 0.5 (i.e., -3 dB of squeezing, which is completely feasible
with current technology, as -10 dB was already obtained [33]) are given in the table 1. It is
evident from the table that at low reconciliation efficiency the limited squeezing can already
achieve tolerance to the channel noise, which is about an order of magnitude higher than is
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Table 1. Values of the maximum tolerable channel excess noise ǫ upon limited reconciliation
efficiency β and optimal displacement variance σ for coherent states V = 1 and moderately
squeezed states V = 0.5, channel transmittance is η = 0.1
Maximum tolerable ǫ
β V = 1 V = 0.5
20% 10−3 1.3 · 10−2
40% 3.7 · 10−3 3.4 · 10−2
60% 1.2 · 10−2 6.3 · 10−2
80% 3.8 · 10−2 1.1 · 10−1
tolerable by coherent states upon the same efficiency β and the same channel transmittance.
Thus, in the region of low efficiency β and in the presence of evident untrusted noise, the
Gaussian CV QKD protocol enters the nonclassical regime when at least moderate squeezing
is required to enable secure key distribution.
Figure 7. Security region for the CV QKD scheme upon RR versus squeezed variance V
and displacement variance σ for channel transmittance η = 0.1 and reconciliation efficiency
β = 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2 (from left to right, from top to bottom).
The reason for this effect is in the behavior of the Holevo quantity χEB, describing the
upper bound on the quantum information, available to an eavesdropper. Indeed, for low β
the contribution of mutual information to the lower bound (1) becomes very low; in addition,
for low channel transmittances η ≪ 1 the mutual information practically does not depend on
squeezing as IAB = ση/ log 4 + O[η]2. Thus, the question is: which kind of states is more
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effectively minimizing the Holevo quantity? Although the Holevo quantity is the entropic
measure of maximum information, available to an eavesdropper, its minimization has direct
physicsl meaning.
For the purely lossy channels the Holevo quantity is minimized with the value 0, which
is reached when the two parts of the quantity χBE = SE − SE|B (calculated from Eve’s
state and Eve’s state conditioned by Bob’s measurement) are equal. From expressions (9)
and (10) for symplectic eigenvalues, which are used to calculate both parts SE and SE|B of
the Holevo quantity, it is evident that the eigenvalues (and, accordingly, the two parts of the
Holevo quantity) are equal when correlation between Bob and Eve is equal to 0. It is achieved,
regardless of channel transmittance, when V xB = 1, i.e. σx = 1− V , where V is the squeezed
state variance in the prepare-and-measure scheme. The typical profile of χEB is given at figure
6 (right) versus signal state squeezing and displacement variance upon purely lossy channel.
In case when channel noise is present, the Holevo quantity is minimized upon the same
value of modulation (the minimum value being positive, i.e. the typical plot of the Holevo
quantity, given in figure 6, is moved up by the channel noise equivalently for any squeezing
and modulation). It was confirmed numerically using the purification method, but can also
be obtained from analytical considerations if entangling cloner attack is considered. Such an
attack was shown to be the optimal individual attack [30] and was recently used to calculate
security against collective attacks [34]. Under entangling cloner attack the correlation
between Bob and Eve’s cloner mode is again directly accessible, it is
√
η(1− η)(1−V xB+ηǫ),
where ǫ is the channel noise. Again, this correlation is minimized upon V xB being equal to 1.
Thus, the minimum of the Holevo quantity, i.e. the minimization of the upper bound on
information, available to Eve, which is relevant in the low β regime upon RR, is achieved upon
complete (for pure channel loss) or maximum possible decoupling of Eve from Bob, when the
correlation between their modes is minimized. It depends solely on the state properties before
channel and is described by the simple condition σx = 1 − V . Evidently, squeezed states
reach this de-correlation upon positive displacement variance, while coherent states minimize
the Holevo quantity only when no displacement is applied. Moreover, in case when the
reconciliation efficiency is arbitrarily small (i.e. β ≪ 1) the security can be achieved only for
σ ≤ 1 − V , which is evidently 0 for Gaussian modulated coherent states, i.e. no information
can be added to coherent states by displacement, when reconciliation efficiency β is low. At
the same time even small squeezing of quantum states allows additional displacement and is
thus able to carry information, contributing to the secure key.
Thereby, the case of low reconciliation efficiency represents the essentially nonclassical
region of QKD, where squeezing plays the main role, whereas the contribution from the
classical resources is minor. From this follows that nonclassical resource, namely squeezing,
can partly substitute the limited classical reconciliation resource.
4. Conclusions
We have analyzed the role of squeezing in the continuous-variable quantum key distribution,
clearly distinguishing squeezing from displacement in a generalized preparation scheme,
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taking into account imperfect reconciliation. We have shown that squeezing improves
tolerance to untrusted noise in both direct and reverse reconciliation schemes and is strictly
required in the direct case when reconciliation efficiency is low. For highly attenuating
channels, corresponding to long-distance links, squeezing demonstrates linear improvement
of the security region in terms of tolerable untrusted noise under optimized displacement.
Hereby, even limitedly squeezed states can provide security in the conditions of a strongly
attenuating channel and in the presence of untrusted noise, contrary to coherent states, which
fail to demonstrate any non-negligible tolerance to noise under the same low reconciliation
efficiency. The reason for the effect is the behavior of the Holevo quantity, upper bounding
the eavesdropper’s information. It turns out to be more effectively minimized by the squeezed
states, i.e. under higher displacement, applied to the states.
Thus, under low reconciliation efficiency, both direct and reverse Gaussian protocols
enter essentially the nonclassical regime, when tolerance to the noticeable channel noise can
be provided only by squeezed states. Weak Gaussian modulation of moderately squeezed
states in the reverse scenario can be a feasible alternative to the discrete modulation of
coherent states for the long-distance links. However, the most effective solution will probably
be the combination of the two approaches with optimization of both modulation scheme and
quantum state as the resource.
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